



2013 Conference "Risk, Recovery & Real Growth"

23rd Annual CAA Conference

Secrets Wild Orchid Montego Bay, Jamaica.

4th to 6th December 2013





Regulatory developments in life assurance

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5 December 2013

Agenda


- The world of international regulation
- The Solvency II saga
- The IAIS and global minimum capital standards
- Principles-based reserving in the US





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
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















Regulatory regime summary (1/2)

Jurisdiction	Factor -based	Movement to a risk- based approach	Already risk based	Comments	Valuation basis
Argentina	X	No clear target			Generally market value for assets, Book value for reserves
Australia			1 year-VaR approach Scenarios and factors	Internal models allowed	Fair value
Brazil			Factor-based for each risk	Market risk to be defined for end of 2014	Mixture of book and market values for assets, book value for reserves
Chile	X	No clear target			Book values
China	x	Targeted 2016		Consultation process ongoing to introduce risk-oriented framework (C-ROSS)	Mixture of book and market value for assets, book value for reserves
Colombia			Factor-based for each risk		Generally market value for assets, Book value for reserves
Europe (EEA)	X	Targeted 2016			Solvency II will introduce full market valuation
Switzerland			Tail Value at Risk, 99% confidence		Market valuation for assets and reserves



Regulatory regime summary (2/2)

Jurisdiction	Factor -based	Movement to a risk- based approach	Already risk based	Comments	Valuation basis
Hong Kong	x	Targeted 2016/17		Consultation underway to introduce RBC framework	Market value for assets
India	X			Supervisors target 150% solvency ratio	Assets valued close to book values GPV for liabilities
Indonesia			Factor-based for each risk	Current phasing-in of revised RBC (from 2013). Supervisors target 120% solvency ratio	Book value for HTM assets, market value for others GPV for liabilities (from 2013)
Japan			Factor-based for each risk	Supervisors can intervene when the ratio is lower than 200%	IFRS equivalent for assets, Book value for reserves
Mexico	x	Targeted 2016			Generally market value for assets, Book value for reserves
Singapore			Factor-based for each risk since 2005	Looking to introduce 'RBC2'; in consultation phase	Market value for assets GPV for liabilities
USA			Factor-based for each risk	Companies usually hold 300% of the RBC	Mainly IFRS



Solvency II

- New regime expected to come into force in January 2016
- Will apply to all insurers and reinsurers registered in the EEA
- No gold plating by individual state regulators
- Solvency II is a risk-based regime covering much more than capital adequacy alone






Solvency II

- Solvency II framework structured around 3 core components:
 - Pillar 1 covers the quantitative requirements, i.e. how much capital should the insurer hold?
 - Pillar 2 covers the governance and risk management requirements, i.e. how is the business run?
 - Pillar 3 relates to the reporting and disclosure requirements
- Aims:
 - Market consistency ✓
 - Harmonise regulatory standards across Europe ✓
 - Provide an early warning system to supervisors ✓
 - Strengthen policyholder security ✓
- Promote in

Solvency II Pillar I – Key Components of financial requirements



Market Consistent Value of technical provisions

 Market value for hedgeable risks and Best Estimate plus Risk Margin for non-hedgeable risks

Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR)

- Reflects a level of capital below which ultimate supervisory action should be triggered
- Calculated on factor basis, corridor of 25%-45% SCR

Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR)

- Target capital which should enable firms to absorb significant unforeseen losses over a specified time horizon
- The standard calculation can be replaced by the use of internal model under supervisory validation

Ladder of Intervention

- Solvency II should guarantee a ladder of intervention if the available capital falls below SCR
- Concept of transferability of Technical Provisions in extreme situations

Solvency II building blocks & hierarchy

Level	Description	Purpose	Responsibility of
1	Directive	Sets out overall framework	Council and Parliament
2	Delegated Acts*	Provides greater level of detail on specifics	Commission with advice from EIOPA
3	Guidelines & Implementing Acts	EU-wide technical standards and regulatory guidelines to ensure consistency	EIOPA
(4	Enforcement	Ensure full and correct implementation by Member States	Commission)



^{*} Formerly known as "Implementing Measures"

Level 1 and impact on Levels 2 and 3

- Text of Solvency II Framework Directive adopted in April 2009 (Level 1)
- A draft "Omnibus II" appeared in January 2011 that proposes to amend some sections of the 2009 Directive and align with EIOPA regulation
- Difficulties with agreeing on appropriate measures to address issues for products with long-term guarantees have delayed finalisation of Omnibus II and led to significant delays in the Solvency II project
- Finalisation of Level 1 is required before other Levels can be publically consulted on - in order to keep momentum, informal pre-consultations and non-public discussions are taking place on Levels 2 and 3
- Provisional agreement was given to the Omnibus II Directive by the trilogue parties (European Parliament, European Commission and Council of the European Union) on 13 November 2013



Level 1 - issues for products with longterm guarantees

- Delays in finalising Level 1 have been caused primarily by discussions on how to treat products with long-term guarantees
- Covers a range of long-term products with interest rate guarantees
- Characterised by highly predictable cashflows and no strain on surrender
- e.g. annuities
- Often backed by high quality fixed interest asset portfolios held to maturity
- As holding to maturity, asset cashflows are only affected by default rates and not spread volatility
- Changes in liability cashflows generally would not <u>force</u> insurers to sell assets early
- Products with long-term guarantees provide essential social benefits, such as retirement provision, in many countries




Level 1 - issues for products with longterm guarantees

A package of measures has been included in the Level 1 text to address these issues:


- **A matching adjustment (MA)** to be applied to the discount rate used to value annuity-style liabilities backed by hold-to-maturity assets to mitigate the impact of spread movements on the balance sheet.
 - Calculated as the spread over risk-free rates on the matching assets less an allowance for defaults (the fundamental spread).
- •A volatility adjustment applied to the discount rate used to value all other business to enable the industry to cope during distressed market conditions.
 - Calibrated as 65% of the risk-adjusted spread over risk-free of assets in a representative portfolio.
- •An extrapolation methodology to extend the risk-free rate beyond the point at which values can be determined from deep, liquid and transparent market data.

Transitional arrangements for existing life insurance business to adjust to olivency II over a period of 16 years (subject to supervisory approval).

Expected Solvency II Timeline



Solvency II Interim Measures



Solvency II - equivalence

- Assessment of equivalence determines which countries have a regulatory system which provides enough policyholder protection that companies will not have to comply with both Solvency II and local regulations
- **Temporary equivalence** is aimed at third country reinsurance and may be granted for 5 years where a third country has committed to adopt an equivalent solvency regime and to engage in the equivalence process.
- **Provisional equivalence** covers group solvency and supervision and may be granted for 10 years (with the possibility to extend for a further 10 years) where the third country can demonstrate it has (or may adopt) a solvency regime capable of being assessed equivalent (no commitment to engage in equivalence process).
- This provision would allow the US to be considered as an equivalent regulatory regime, allowing European firms with US subsidiaries to use local regulatory methods when calculating group solvency requirements.
- This will also provide flexibility to develop pragmatic solutions for other regulatory regimes to ensure that European groups are not disadvantaged when operating in third countries.

Agenda

- The world of international regulation
- The Solvency II saga
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- Principles-based reserving in the US



IAIS and the ORSA

- Many of the global developments stem from the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).
- The IAIS requires an Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) as part of Insurance Core Principle 16 (ICP16) on ERM, adopted in October 2010
- The inclusion of an ORSA requirement within the ICPs has resulted in an effective worldwide requirement for an ORSA, albeit one that can vary in certain respects from country to country.


Examples include:

- Australia where the first ORSA submissions have already been lodged.
- Across Europe (via Solvency II) the preparatory guidelines will introduce an ORSA requirement during 2014 for most large European insurance companies
- The US the first ORSA reports are scheduled to be produced before the end of 2015.



The ORSA - overview

- The ORSA aims to reveal the linkages between capital and risk within a firm.
- The ORSA is company specific and should include identification and assessment of all material risks the company is exposed to.
- ORSA overview:
- Top down process owned by the Board
 - Board needs to know what risks the Company is running
 - Has it sufficient capital for the next 3-5 years?
 - Enhance awareness of relationship between risks and capital
- Link between capital, risk management and strategy
 - Is the company comfortable with the risks it is running?
 - Has it enough capital?
 - Should it review its strategy?





Global systemically important financial institutions

- Globally systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) were introduced at the request of G20 leaders following the 2007-2012 financial crisis
- G-SIFIs are defined by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as:

"institutions of such size, market importance, and global interconnectedness that their distress or failure would cause significant dislocation in the global financial system and adverse economic consequences across a range of countries."

- Global Systemic Insurance Institutions (G-SIIs) are one class of G-SIFIs
- International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) published a set of policy measures including:
 - recovery and resolution planning requirements;
 - enhanced group-wide supervision; and
 - higher loss absorbency (HLA) requirements.


IAIS - G-SIIs



Based on an initial assessment, 9 G-SIIs identified by FSB 18 July 2013



IAIS – G-SIIs expected timeline



IAIS - ComFrame


- Common Framework for the Supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups to be implemented by all IAIS members
- Aims to foster global convergence of regulatory and supervisory measures and approaches for Internationally Active Insurance Groups (IAIGs)

ComFrame is structured in three Modules:

- 1. **Scope of ComFrame** includes the criteria and process for the identification of IAIGs by supervisors, the breadth of supervision of IAIGs (which legal entities are included) and the identification of the group-wide supervisor.
- 2. The IAIG contains the requirements an IAIG will need to meet.
- 3. **The Supervisors** covers the process of supervision, highlighting the role of the group-wide supervisor and other relevant supervisors' responsibilities within the process. The module covers the supervisory process, enforcement, cooperation and interaction requirements.



IAIS – ComFrame Timeline





But not everyone is moving the same way...

- While many countries are displaying moves towards a principles-based style of regulation, recent developments in the US indicate that not everyone is convinced...
- In response to concerns from New York regulator that firms writing Universal Life with secondary guarantee (ULSG) products at a national level within the US were under reserved...
- ...NAIC Joint working group developed a modified "principles-based reserving" (PBR) approach as a temporary measure until PBR becomes effective
- New York regulator carried out an analysis and the ULSG reserves as at 31
 December 2012 increased much less than expected under the modified rules
- As a result, the New York regulator has disallowed this modified interim reserve basis and has resolved not to implement full PBR arrangement and has cautioned the NAIC to "seriously rethink its march towards implementation of PBR" stressing that:

"In its current form, PBR represents an unwise move away from reserve requirements that are established by formulas and diligently policed by insurance regulators in favor of internal models developed by insurance companies themselves"



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